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THE SUPREME COURT'S EXCESSIVE
DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE BODIES
UNDER EIGHTH AMENDMENT
SENTENCING REVIEW
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Ewing v. California,' five Justices of the Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the State of California from
sentencing a repeat felon to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole for the first twenty-five years of the term for the theft of $1,200
worth of golf clubs under the State's "Three Strikes and You're Out
Laws." 2 Nonetheless, seven Justices restated that the Eighth Amendment
forbids prison sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. The
Court's plurality opinion applied the analytical framework introduced in
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan,4 which
counsels judges to consider four principles when assessing disproportionate
sentencing claims.5 First, criminal punishment determinations are normally
the province of legislative bodies. 6 Second, the Eighth Amendment allows
a variety of legitimate penological theories beyond retribution.' Third, the
nature of our federal system allows diverse sentencing determinations
among the States! Finally, proportionality review should be guided by
objective factors. 9 The Court held that California's policy decision to

1 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (plurality opinion).
2 Id. (plurality opinion); id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
3 Jd. at 23 (plurality opinion); id. at 35 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
4 501 U.S. 957, 998-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
5 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
6 Id. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
7 Id. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
8 Id. at 999-1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
9 Id. at 1000-0 1 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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incapacitate criminals who have already been convicted of at least one
serious or violent crime was constitutional.' 0
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision was wrong
because it gives too much deference to legislative bodies. The Court needs
to assert a more active role in protecting an individual's Eighth Amendment
protection from excessive prison sentence. In addition, the Court needs to
define the elements it considers under prison sentence review. This Note
will examine: (1) the legal history and Supreme Court case law on the issue
of proportionality in criminal sentencing; (2) the background and
procedural history of Ewing's disproportionate sentencing claim; (3) the
positions taken by the Justices in their final determination of the case; (4)
the effect the Court's decision will have on sentence proportionality claims;
and (5) the Court's sentence proportionality jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."" The language of the Eighth Amendment can be traced back to
the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.12 However, commentators
dispute what punishments were barred under the English Declaration of
Rights.' 3 In addition, commentators dispute how Americans interpreted the
text of the Eighth Amendment when they adopted it in 1791.4
The English common law prohibited excessive punishments when the
English Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1689.1 5 Originally, English
law punished criminal activity not with imprisonment but with financial
fines called amercements.' 6 The Magna Carta required that the amercement
imposed on a criminal not to exceed the severity of his crime.' 7 When
prison sentences began replacing amercements during the 1400s as the

10538 U.S. at 31 (plurality opinion).

11U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

12 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: " The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839,

840 (1969).
13 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-67.
14 Compare id. at 979-86, with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983).

15See Granucci, supra note 12, at 847.
16 Id. at 845.
7 Id. at 845-46.
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common mode of criminal punishment in England, English courts extended
the protection from excessive punishments to prison sentences. 18
The English Declaration of Rights was adopted after the turbulent
regime of King James II ended in 1688.19 James II provoked the anger of
Anglicans with his sympathy to English Catholics. 20 In 1685, the King's
Anglican nephew attempted an unsuccessful overthrow of the King.2'
Afterwards, the King established a special commission to prosecute those
who aided the rebellion.2 2 Many of the rebels were executed by brutal
means, such as disemboweling.23 Thus, many commentators argue that the
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause was meant to prohibit cruel
modes of punishments like those imposed by the special commission.2 4
Other commentators disagree, observing that the special commission was
only mentioned once during the adoption of the Declaration of Rights.25
Instead, Parliament was concerned about common law courts imposing
punishments on religious matters that should have been decided by
ecclesiastical courts.26 Thus, these commentators argue that the Declaration
of Rights affirmed the English common law prohibition against excessive
punishment with the addition of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments"
Clause to forbid punishments not within a court's jurisdiction.2 7
The historical evidence surrounding the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment indicates that people were mainly concerned about methods of
punishments.28
Historians only note two references to the Eighth
Amendment during the proposal and adoption of the Federal Bill of
Rights.29 In both cases, the references refer to kinds of punishments, not
proportionality. 30 Thus, most commentators believe the American Framers
only meant to forbid cruel types of punishment under the Eighth

18Id. at 845-47. However, English law did punish certain grave crimes with death. Id. at
846.
'9 See id. at 852-60.
20 Id. at 852.
21 Id. at 853.
22
23

Id.
Id. at 854 ("The penalty for treason at the time consisted of drawing the condemned

man on a cart to the gallows, where he was hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive,
disemboweled and his bowels burnt before him, and then beheaded and quartered.").
24 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 970-74 (1991).
25 See Granucci, supra note 12, at 854-56.
26 Id. at 858-60.
27 Id. at 859-60.
2 Id. at 841-42.
29 id.
30 id.
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Amendment. 31 However, some commentators note that Americans believed
they retained the same rights as English citizens, including the English
common law prohibition against excessive prison sentences. 32 They argue
that these debates merely indicate that Americans wanted to extend the
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause to include the harsh punishments
they experienced under English rule.33
B. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON PROPORTIONALITY
REQUdREMENTS TO SENTENCING
The Supreme Court first discussed a proportionality requirement in
sentencing under the Eighth Amendment in 1892 in O 'Neil v. Vermont. 34 In
O'Neil, a county court sentenced the defendant to over fifty-four years of
hard labor in the house of corrections for 307 offenses of selling liquor
without authority. 35 The majority's opinion declined to consider the
question of whether the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because
the defendant had not raised the issue in his appeal, and because the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to states at the time.36 Justice Field dissented,
arguing that the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause protects "against
all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offenses charged. 3 7 Justices Harlan and Brewer also
contended that the sentence must be found cruel and unusual in view of the
offense committed.3 8
Eighteen years later in Weems v. United States,39 the Supreme Court
indicated that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality in
sentencing. 40 A trial court sentenced Weems to the statutorily required
fifteen years labor in prison with a chain attached to his ankle for falsifying
a government document. 4' The sentence also subjected Weems to loss of
31 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979-86 (1991); Granucci, supra note 12, at
860-65.
32 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983).
33Id.
34 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
31 Id. at 330.
36

Id. at 331-32.

31 Id. at 339-40

(Field, J., dissenting) (asserting that the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishments" Clause is not only directed "to punishments which inflict torture, such as the
rack, the thumb-screw, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs, and the like, which are attended
with acute pain and suffering").
38 Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39 217 U.S. 349, 359-66 (1910).
40

Id.

41 Id. at

362-66.
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civil rights and surveillance after his release.42 The Supreme Court found
both the method of punishment and the relationship between the crime
committed and the punishment imposed to offend the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishments" Clause.43 On proportionality, the Court stated, "it is a precept
of justice that punishment for crime should begraduated and proportioned
to offense. 44 Justice McKenna refused to interpret the Eighth Amendment
narrowly by only prohibiting certain modes of punishment used before the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.45 He argued that the Eighth Amendment
should not "be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore
taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
be capable of wider
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must
46
application than the mischief which gave it birth.
In 1962, the Supreme Court held in Robinson v. California47 that the
Eighth Amendment applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
and that imprisoning a defendant because he was addicted to drugs violated
the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause. 8 The Court agreed that the
state had a legitimate interest in combating narcotic traffic, but held that this
was not a legitimate means for combating the problem.4 9 Courts should
determine whether a punishment violates the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishments" Clause by a proportional comparison between the offense and
sentence, and not on an abstract assessment of the punishment: "To be sure,
imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is
either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the
abstract. Even one day in prison would be50 a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold.",
In 1980, the Court in Rummel v. Estelle51 held that the federal courts
are not to apply proportionality review of prison sentences for felony crimes
The trial court
except in the most extreme situations imaginable.
sentenced Rummel to a mandated life sentence under a Texas recidivist
statute for his third felony conviction with eligibility for parole in twelve
42

Id.

41 Id. at 366-67.
44 Id. at 367.
41 Id. at 373.
46
47

48

id.
370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).

Id.

49 Id.

at 667-68.

so Id. at 667.

s 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980).
52 See id. at 274 n. 11 (conceding the proportionality principle would come into play if a
legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment).
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years. 53 Rummel's case was notable because his convictions were all
property-related and involved modest sums: fraudulent use of a credit card
to obtain $80 worth of goods and services, passing a forged check for
$28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. 54 In a five to four
decision, Justice Rehnquist stressed that determining proportional prison
sentences is a subjective determination best decided by legislative bodies.55
The Court rejected Rummel's argument that his sentence was
disproportionate because no other jurisdiction punished habitual offenders
as harshly as Texas.56 First, the Court was unconvinced that Texas's
recidivist statute was clearly harsher than other jurisdictions. 57 Second, the
Court noted that parole and prosecutorial discretion made comparative
analysis of recidivist statutes across states too complex. 8 Finally, the Court
noted that federalism naturally leads some states to have harsher penalties
than other states due to differences in local interests, and courts should not
forbid such states from protecting unique interests. 59
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Rummel two years later in a six
Justice per curiam opinion in Hutto v. Davis.6 ° In Hutto, a Virginia state
court sentenced the defendant to forty years imprisonment for both
possession with intent to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of
marijuana. 61 The majority opinion repeated "that federal courts should be
'reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,' and
that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences'
should be 'exceedingly rare."' 6 2 The opinion also rejected the four-factor
test used by the lower court to gauge proportionality: (1) the nature of the
crime; (2) the legislative purpose behind the choice of punishment for the
crime; (3) a comparison of sentences for the same crime in other
jurisdictions; and (4) a comparison of the seriousness
of crimes punished by
63
the same sentence in the same jurisdiction.

51Id. at 264, 266, 267.
14

Id. at 265-66.

" Id. at 283-84.
56 Id. at 277-80.
57Id. at 279-80.

5 Id. at 280-81.
9 Id. at 281-82.
60 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
61

Id. at 371.

62 Id. at 374 (alteration in original) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274, 272
(1980)) (internal citations omitted).
63 Id. at 373.
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In 1983, the Supreme Court reversed its position on testing the
proportionality of sentences. In Solem v. Helm,64 a five Justice majority
held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes a life sentence without
possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony. 65 The majority
distinguished Rummel because the defendant in Rummel had a possibility of
parole.66 The majority based its holding on the standards implicitly
developed by the Court's opinions from Weems to Rummel.67 The Solem
Court advanced a three-part test: (1) whether the severity of the punishment
was proportional to the offense; (2) a comparison of the punishment to
other punishments in the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses; and
(3) a comparison of the punishments for the same offense in other
jurisdictions. 68 Applying these factors to the defendant's case, the Court
held that the punishment violated the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments"
Clause. In particular, the Court emphasized that Solem had no possibility of
for parole in twelve
parole, while the defendant in Rummel was eligible
70
69
Rummel.
overrule
not
did
Court
the
years. Thus,
The Supreme Court did not address proportionality in sentencing again
until 1991 in Harmelin v. Michigan.7 1 A Michigan court sentenced
Harmelin under a mandatory sentencing statute to life imprisonment
without the possibility for parole for possession of more than 650 grams of
cocaine.72 Five Justices held that Harmelin's sentence did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.7 3 In a concurring opinion joined by two other Justices,
Justice Kennedy recognized four proportionality principles in the Court's
previous decisions: (1) the setting of the lengths of prison terms had its
primacy in the legislative branch; (2) the Eighth Amendment does not
mandate adoption of any one penological system; (3) the recognition of the
benefits of a federal system of government; and (4) the requirement that
proportionality review be guided by objective factors.7 4 Considering these
principles, Justice Kennedy concluded, "The Eighth Amendment does not
require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids
' 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
61 Id. at 303.
66 Id.
67
68
69
70

Id. at 286-89.
Id. at 290-92.
Id. at 297.
Id.

"' 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
71

Id. at 961.

73 Id.

at 994; id. at 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
74 Id. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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75
only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.
Justice Kennedy stressed the severity of the defendant's drug offense and
Michigan's legitimate interest in combating drugs to uphold the defendant's
sentence.76 Finally, Justice Kennedy stated that the Court will not compare
the defendant's crime with other crimes punished in the jurisdiction by
similar sentences, nor compare sentences imposed for the same crime in
other jurisdictions, unless "a threshold comparison of the crime committed
and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross
77

disproportionality.,

C. CALIFORNIA'S "THREE STRIKES" LEGISLATION
California's current three strikes law was designed to increase the
prison terms of repeat felons.7 8 The statute applies to a defendant convicted
of a felony, who has previously been convicted of one or more prior
felonies defined as "serious" or "violent" by the statute. 9 Prosecutors must
allege prior convictions in the charging document.80 The jury, or the judge
if a jury
trial is waived, must decide if the alleged prior convictions are
1
true.

8

If the prosecution proves a defendant has one prior "serious" or
"violent" felony conviction, then the court must sentence him to "twice the
82
term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction."
If the prosecution proves a defendant has two or more prior "serious" or
"violent" felony convictions, then the court must sentence him to "an
indeterminate term of life imprisonment." 83 Defendants sentenced to life
under the three strikes law become eligible for parole on a date calculated
by reference to a "minimum term," which is the greater of: (a) three times
the term otherwise required for the current conviction; (b) twenty-five
years; or (c) the term determined by the court pursuant to § 1170 for the
underlying conviction, including any enhancements.84

7IId. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
76

Id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

7 Id. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
78

Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion).

79 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2002).
80 § 1025 (West 2002).
s Id. § 1158.
82

§ 667(e)(1) (West 1999); § I 170.12(c)(1) (West 2002).

83
84

§ 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999); § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 2002).
§§ 667(e)(2)(A)(i-iii) (West 1999); §§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i-iii) (West 2002).
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Under California law, courts can classify certain offenses as either
felonies or misdemeanors.8 5 These offenses are termed "wobblers. 86 A
"wobbler" can act as a triggering offense under California's three strikes
law if courts treat it as a felony. 87 A "wobbler" is "presumptively a felony
and 'remains a felony except when the discretion is actually exercised' to
make the crime a misdemeanor." 88 Prosecutors may exercise their89
discretion to charge a "wobbler" as either a felony or a misdemeanor.
Similarly, California trial courts can reduce a "wobbler" charged as a felony90
to a misdemeanor, thus avoiding imposition of a three strikes sentence.
When exercising this discretion, a court should consider "those factors that
direct similar sentencing decisions," such as "the nature and circumstances
of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the
offense ....

[and] the general objectives of sentencing."

California trial courts may also vacate allegations of prior "serious" or
"violent" felony convictions. 91 This may be done either sua sponte or on
motion by the prosecution. 92 In deciding whether to vacate allegations of
prior felony convictions, a judge should consider whether, "'in light of the
nature and circumstances of [the defendant's] present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the [three strikes] scheme's spirit, in whole or in part."' 93 Thus, the three
strikes statute gives trial courts discretion to avoid imposing a three strikes
sentence by either reducing a "wobbler" to a misdemeanor or by vacating
allegations of prior "serious" or "violent" felony convictions.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the morning of March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing entered the pro shop
of the El Segundo Golf Course in Los Angeles County, California. 94 He
looked around the shop for ten to fifteen minutes, and then approached the
employee of the shop and purchased a token redeemable for golf balls on
85Ewing, 538 U.S. at 16 (2003) (plurality opinion).
86 Id. (plurality opinion).
87 Id. (plurality opinion).
88Id. (plurality opinion).
89 Id. at 17 (plurality opinion).
90 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17(b)(5), 17(b)(1) (West 1999); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17 (plurality
opinion).
91Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17 (plurality opinion).
92 Id. (plurality opinion).
93 Id. (plurality opinion).

94 Id. at 17-18 (plurality opinion).
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the driving range. 95 He looked around the shop once more, this time in the
area of the golf clubs. 96 He again approached the employee, asking him
where he could find the driving range. 97 He then exited with a noticeable
limp through the door leading back to the parking lot, rather than the door
leading to the driving range. 98 Suspicious of Ewing's behavior, the shop
employee telephoned the police. 99 When the police officers arrived, they
noticed Ewing removing three golf clubs from his pants beside his car in the
parking lot.' 00 The police then arrested Ewing and took possession of the
golf clubs, each of which retailed at $399.01
Prior to Ewing's arrest on March 12, 2000, Ewing had been convicted
of eight misdemeanors and four felonies.' 0 2 Between 1984 and 1993, he
was convicted of felony grand theft auto (later reduced to a misdemeanor),
petty theft with a prior theft conviction, battery, theft, burglary, possession
of drug paraphernalia, appropriation of lost property, and unlawful
possession of a firearm and trespassing.'0 3 These misdemeanor convictions
04
resulted in several periods of incarceration in jail and terms of probation.
On three separate dates between October and November 1993, Ewing
committed three burglaries and one robbery at an apartment complex in
Long Beach, California.10 5 In one incident, Ewing ordered the victim to
hand over his wallet.'0 6 When the victim resisted, Ewing produced a knife
and entered the victim's apartment. 0 7 In a single criminal proceeding, a
California court found Ewing guilty of three burglaries and one robbery and
sentenced him to a single term of imprisonment of nine years, eight
months. 10 8 Ewing was released on parole after serving approximately five
and a half years. 0 9 Ewing stole the golf clubs at issue here ten months
later.' 10
95 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978).
96 Id.
97 id.

9' Id. at 2-3.
99 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion).
100 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Ewing (No. 0 1-6978).
10' Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion).
10 Id. at 18-19 (plurality opinion).
103Id. at 18 (plurality opinion).
104 Id. (plurality opinion).
105 Id. (plurality opinion).

106 Id. at 19 (plurality opinion).
07 Id. (plurality opinion).
108Brief for Petitioner at 5, Ewing (No. 0 1-6978).
109 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion).
1l0 Id. (plurality opinion).
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The state charged Ewing with one count of felony burglary and one
In
count of felony grand theft of personal property in excess of $400."1
accordance with California's three strikes law, the prosecutor formally
alleged that Ewing had previously sustained four serious or violent felonies
for the three burglaries and the robbery in the Long Beach apartment
complex." 12 A jury found Ewing guilty of felony grand theft, and the judge
found that Ewing had done the four previous felony convictions.' 3
At the sentencing hearing, Ewing asked the court to reduce the
conviction for grand theft, a "wobbler" under California law, to a
misdemeanor. 14 If the court granted Ewing's request, then the grand theft
15
charge would not constitute a triggering offense for the three strikes law."
Ewing also moved, in the alternative, for the trial court to strike some or all
of his prior serious or violent felony convictions.' 16 Striking all of Ewing's
prior convictions would have allowed the judge to impose an ordinary
prison sentence of up to four years.' 17 Striking three of Ewing's priorconvictions would have resulted only in a doubled prison sentence for the
grand theft." 8 Finally, Ewing asked the court to consider his age and health
condition as a mitigating factor-he was thirty-eight and had AIDS, which
had already caused blindness to one of his eyes." 9 Based on Ewing's
criminal history and the fact that the theft of the golf clubs took place while
he was on parole, the trial court denied Ewing's requests. 120 Thus, the trial
court sentenced Ewing under the three strikes law to twenty-five years to
12 1
life.
122
The California Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
The California Court of Appeal denied Ewing's claim that the trial court
erred by not reducing the grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor or not
1 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No.
01-6978); see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459-61,484,489 (West 2002).
112Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, Ewing (No. 01-6978); see § 667(g) (West
1999); § 1170.12(e) (West 2002).
"13 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, Ewing (No. 01-6978).
114 Id.; see § 17(b) (West 1999); § 667(d)(1) (West 1999); § 1170.12(b)(1) (West 2002).
115Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, Ewing (No. 0 1-6978).
116Id.; see § 1385 (West 1999).
117Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Ewing (No. 01-6978); see §§ 17-18, 486-87,
667.5 (West 2002).
118 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, Ewing (No. 01-6978); see § 667(e)(1) (West
1999); § 1 170.12(c)(1) (West 2002).
19 Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Ewing (No. 01-6978).
120 People v. Ewing, No. B143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
Apr. 25, 2001).
121 Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 2002).
122Ewing, 2001 WL 1840666, at *5.
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striking any of his prior felony convictions.123 Also, the trial court
24
sufficiently reached its factual conclusions to deny Ewing's requests.
The California Court of Appeal also denied Ewing's claim that his sentence
was grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment based on the
Supreme Court's holding in Rummel.125 The Supreme Court of California
denied Ewing's petition for review. 26 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 1 7 to decide whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of twenty
1 28
five years to life under the State's "Three Strikes and You're Out" law.
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S PLURALITY OPINION

Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy, reiterated that the Eighth Amendment contains a narrow
proportionality principle for prison sentences. 2 9 The opinion adopted the
proportionality principles established in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Harmelin.'30 First, courts should defer to legislative bodies in determining
criminal policy.13' Second, the Eighth Amendment allows a variety of
legitimate penological theories.132 Third, the nature of our federal system
allows diverse sentencing determinations among the states. 33 Finally,
proportionality review should be guided by objective factors. 34 These
principles of proportionality review are factors to consider in a
35
proportionality claim, not the test for a proportionality claim.1
123 Id. at

*2-3.
Id.
125 Id.at *4.
124

126 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality opinion).

127
121
129
"'

Ewing v. California, 535 U.S. 969 (2002).
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 20 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 20-24 (plurality opinion) ("The proportionality principles in our cases distilled
in Justice Kennedy's concurrence [in Harmelin] guide our application of the Eighth
Amendment....").
131Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-99 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
132 Id. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
113Id. at 999-1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
114 Id. at 1000-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
135A proportionality claim begins with a threshold comparison of the crime committed
and the criminal's sentence.
If the comparison leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality, then courts should conduct a comparative analysis between defendant's
sentence and sentences imposed for other crimes in the same state and sentences imposed for

EWING v. CALIFORNIA

2004]

The Court first reviewed California's purposes in enacting its three
strikes statute.' 36 The California Legislature made the deliberate choice to
enact the three strikes law to address the severe problem of crime by repeat
felons.' 37 Accordingly, California decided incapacitation of individuals
who repeatedly engaged in serious or violent criminal behavior was
necessary in order to protect the public safety. 38 Indeed, many other states
enacted similar three strikes laws between 1993 and 1995.139 The Eighth
Amendment does not forbid California from choosing to incapacitate repeat
felons. 140
Courts should defer to legislative policy choices on
punishment.' 4' Studies indicate that past felons are a serious public safety
concern in California and throughout the Nation. 142 Thus, California had a
legitimate interest in incapacitating repeat criminals. 43 Though many
critics have doubted the principles, effectiveness, and cost-efficiency of the
three strikes laws, the Supreme Court does not sit as "superlegislature" to
"second-guess" the legislature. 44 The legislature has the responsibility of
making the
difficult policy choices in constructing a criminal sentencing
45
scheme.

The Court then assessed Ewing's specific claim that his sentence of
twenty-five years to life was disproportionate to his offense. 146 The Court
addressed the threshold question of whether an inference of gross
disproportionality resulted from a comparison of Ewing's offense to the
harshness of his punishment. 147 In assessing the severity of Ewing's
offense, the Court did not just consider Ewing's offense for felony grand
theft, but also his long history of felony recidivism. 148 Otherwise, the Court
would not properly defer to the legislature's choice of punishments for
repeat felons. 149 Ewing's severe sentence was justified by California's
the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 1001-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
136 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-28 (plurality opinion).
137 Id. at 25-28 (plurality opinion).
138

Id. (plurality opinion).

1'9 Id. at 24 (plurality opinion).
140 Id.

at 25 (plurality opinion).

141Id. (plurality opinion).
142 Id. at 26 (plurality opinion) (noting several studies indicating that felony offenders
had high recidivism rates).
143 Id. (plurality

opinion).

144 Id. at 27-28 (plurality opinion).
1s Id. at 28 (plurality opinion).

146Id. (plurality opinion).
147 Id. (plurality opinion).
141 Id. at 29 (pluralityopinion).
149 Id. (plurality opinion).
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"public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and
50
amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record.'
Therefore,
51
'
claim.
Amendment
the plurality rejected Ewing's Eighth
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRING OPINION
In Justice Scalia's concurrence, he argued that the Eighth Amendment
does not require proportionality review of prison sentences. 5 1 Justice
Scalia first reiterated his position that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishments" only proscribed certain modes of
punishment and was not a guarantee against disproportionate sentences.'53
Justice Scalia would accept a narrow proportionality principle out of
respect for stare decisis, but does not believe courts could apply it
intelligently. 54 In particular, Justice Scalia argued that proportionality
review is inapplicable given the Court's acceptance of a variety of
penological theories.155 The concept of proportionality between offense and
punishment is "inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution."' 56 However, proportionality is not related to other accepted
penological
theories,
such
as
deterrence,
rehabilitation,
and
incapacitation. 57 Thus, the proportionality assessment comparing the
gravity of the offense against the harshness of punishment does not help
settle whether the punishment is justified by the "State's public-safety
interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons."'' 58 Courts could
demand that punishments reasonably pursue the penological goal of a
statute. 59 However, this would require courts to evaluate policy decisions,
rather than apply the law. 160

C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Thomas's brief concurrence concluded that the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality principle.' 6' Instead, the Eighth
150

Id. at 29-30 (plurality opinion).

'5'

Id. at 30-31 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

152

153Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
114Id. (Scalia,

J., concurring in the judgment).

' Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
151Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
151Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
158Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

159Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
160 Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
161Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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Amendment only forbids modes of punishment.' 62 Since the Supreme
Court accepts imprisonment as a constitutional mode of punishment, then
Ewing's sentence is63 constitutional under the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishments" Clause. 1
D. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsberg, reiterated that the Eighth Amendment forbids prison terms that
are "grossly disproportionate."'' 64 Justice Breyer accepted, "for present
purposes," the analytical framework used by the plurality.' 65 Thus, a court
must compare whether the crime committed and the sentence imposed lead
to an inference of gross disproportionality.166 If a claim meets this
threshold requirement, then courts should conduct a comparative analysis
between the defendant's sentence and sentences imposed for other crimes in
67
the state and sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.'
This analysis would confirm
whether the sentence is grossly
68
disproportionate to a crime.'
Justice Breyer then considered the threshold question of whether
Ewing's punishment was grossly disproportionate to his offense. First,
Justice Breyer compared Ewing's punishment with the punishments
presented in the Supreme Court's two previous disproportionality claims
concerning recidivist sentencing in Rummel and Solem. 169 Three different
sentence-related characteristics define the relevant spectrum: (1) "the
length of the prison term in real time, i.e., the time that the offender is likely
actually to spend in prison;" (2) the sentence-triggering criminal offense;
and (3) the offender's criminal history.17 0 Analyzing these factors among
the defendants in Rummel and Solem, Justice Breyer concluded that the one
critical factor that explained the difference in outcomes in the two cases was
the length of the likely prison term in real time.17 ' Justice Breyer found that
Ewing's sentence-triggering criminal offense and criminal history differed
162 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 966-85 (1991)).

163 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 96685).
16 Id. at 35-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171Id. at 38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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little from the claimants in Rummel and Solem. 17 2 However, the length of
Ewing's prison term in real time fell in between Rummel's and Helm's (the
claimant in Solem). 173 Thus, Ewing's claim fell within the "twilight zone"
174
between Solem and Rummel.
1 75
Justice Breyer then turned to the seriousness of Ewing's offense.
Ewing's sentence-triggering behavior ranked "well toward the bottom of
the criminal conduct scale" considering the harm caused to society, the
magnitude of the offense, and the offender's culpability. 76 Ewing's past
criminal conduct should not be included in an assessment of the seriousness
of his offense, because the proper analysis is to consider "the offense that
triggers the life sentence."' 177 Finally, many judges would consider Ewing's
sentence disproportionate based on The United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines. 178 Factoring these three considerations together,
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's claim must pass the threshold test as
79
appearing to be grossly disproportionate. 1
After Ewing's claim passed the threshold test, Justice Breyer first
conducted a comparative analysis between the defendant's sentence and
sentences imposed for other crimes in the state. 180 Recidivists in California
rarely received sentences as long as Ewing, especially those who were also
convicted of grand theft. In addition, criminals convicted of far worse
crimes than Ewing receive sentences equal or less than Ewing.' 81 Justice
Breyer then conducted a comparative analysis between the defendant's
sentence and sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
First, the United States would impose a sentence not to exceed eighteen
months under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on a recidivist like
Ewing. 182 Second, courts could not sentence a Ewing-type offender to more

172 Id. at
173 Id. at
174 Id. at
175 Id. at

38-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer maintained that Ewing's offense
"ranks toward the bottom of the scale," when he considered three other factors suggested by
the Solicitor General: the frequency of the crime's commission, the difficulty in detecting the
crime, and the degree with which the crime may be deterred by differing amounts of
punishment. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Courts are to consider the defendant's criminal
history when considering the severity of the sentence: Id.
17' Ewing, 538 U.S. at 41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
0 Id. at 42-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 44-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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than ten years in prison in thirty-three other jurisdictions.' 83 In nine other
jurisdictions, however, courts possibly could sentence a Ewing-type
offender to a sentence of twenty-five years or more.' 84 Nonetheless, Justice
Breyer concluded that a comparison of other sentencing practices, both in
California and in other jurisdictions, validated his initial threshold
determination that Ewing's sentence was grossly disproportionate to his
85

crime.'

Finally, Justice Breyer assessed California's penological goals that
might justify Ewing's disproportionately harsh sentence.1 86 First, ease in
administering California's three strike law sentencing is not a valid
justification for sentencing Ewing to such a severe sentence., 87 Second, a
temporal order anomaly existed in California's three strikes statute. 188 That
is, California had lower qualifications for a third strike than the other
strikes. 189 Thus, a criminal who graduated from two serious crimes to a
lesser crime could be subject to the three strikes statute while a criminal
who graduated from a less serious crime to two crimes that are more serious
would not be subject to the three strikes statute. 90 Third, California's
statute classifies petty theft as a felony only when a defendant has a
previous property-related felony offense, not when the defendant has been
only convicted of violent felony offenses unrelated to property. 91 Justice
Breyer concluded that these anomalies were unnecessary to promote
California's criminal law objectives.1 92 Therefore,
Ewing's sentence was
93
grossly disproportionate to his triggering conduct.'
E. JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens's dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer, countered the conclusions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas that
proportionality review is not capable of judicial application.1 94 First,
Supreme Court case law confirmed a proportionality doctrine in the Eighth

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185Id. at 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 47-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 31-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183

184
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Amendment.195 Second, it would be anomalous if the Eighth Amendment
protected against excessive fines and bail, but not against other excessive
punishments.' 96 Third, the absence of a black letter rule for proportionality
review does not "disable judges from exercising their discretion in
construing the outer limits on sentencing authority that the Eighth
Amendment imposes."' 97
Fourth, judges have always employed
proportionality principles when determining sentences absent legislatively
mandated sentences.' 98
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that
proportionality review is not only capable of judicial application but also
required by the Eighth Amendment. 199
V. THE EFFECT OF EWING V. CALIFORNIA ON SENTENCE PROPORTIONALITY
JURISPRUDENCE
A. HARMELIN AND LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF SENTENCE
DISPROPORTIONALITY CLAIMS BEFORE EWING

Harmelin v. Michigan20 0 was the Supreme Court's last statement on
Eighth Amendment sentence proportionality before Ewing. Justice
Kennedy's concurrence stated that courts should not conduct a comparative
analysis of sentences within and outside a state as specified in Solem, unless
a threshold comparison of the sentence imposed and the crime committed
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. 20' However, Justice
Kennedy did not explicitly state what criteria should be used to determine if
a sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime. 2 Instead, Justice
Kennedy counseled judges to consider four principles when assessing
disproportionate sentencing claims.2 °3 Most lower courts accepted Justice

195See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding it violated the Eighth
Amendment, because of disproportionality, to impose the death penalty upon a participant in
a felony that results in murder, without any inquiry into the participant's intent to kill).
196 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that judges do similar proportionality review in
assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages).
198Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
201Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
202 See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[Justice Kennedy]

did not outline specific criteria for courts to consider in making this threshold determination
of gross disproportionality.").
203 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin as the controlling rule of law even
though it was only joined by two other Justices. 204
After Harmelin, lower court decisions assessing sentence
disproportionality claims were typically organized into two sections. First,
the court would reiterate the principles of proportionality, emphasizing that
criminal punishment determinations are normally the province of legislative
bodies. 20 5 This set the tone for the court's analysis of the defendant's
disproportionality claim. That is, a court should err towards finding a
sentence constitutional when it does not clearly contradict Supreme Court
precedent. 20 6 Second, the court would apply the Supreme Court's
disproportionality test by first determining whether an inference of gross
disproportionality existed.20 7 Lacking definite factors to consider in this
determination, most lower courts would make this determination by
20 8
comparing the facts of the case with the facts in Supreme Court cases.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a
life sentence for a recidivist drug offender convicted of selling 486 grams of
cocaine base was constitutional based on a comparison with the
constitutional sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a first-time
offender convicted of selling 672 grams of cocaine in Harmelin.20 9 If a
court found an inference of gross disproportionality between the sentence
and the crime, the court would then conduct a comparative analysis of

204 See, e.g., Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Since Harmelin,

our court and others have applied the principles outlined in Mr. Justice Kennedy's opinion to
cases like the present one."). But see United States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1995)
("[T]he continuing applicability of the Solem test is indicated by the fact that a majority of
the Harmelin Court either declined expressly to overrule Solem or explicitly approved of
Solem."). Although conforming to Supreme Court precedent, it is somewhat odd that Justice
Kennedy's concurrence became the accepted rule of law considering that four Justices
believed Solem should control, three Justices accepted Justice Kennedy's concurrence, and
two Justices argued that the Eighth Amendment had no sentence proportionality
requirement. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957. One court explained the result by noting that a
majority of the Court (the five Justices that either joined the opinion of the Court or Justice
Kennedy's concurrence) rejected the continued application of Solem. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at
1282. However, a majority of the Court (the six Justices that joined the opinion of the Court
or dissented) did not accept Justice Kennedy's reasoning either.
205 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 942 (5th Cir. 1997).
206 See, e.g., id.
207 See, e.g., Henderson, 258 F.3d at 709-12; Gonzales, 121 F.3d at 942-44.
208 See, e.g., Henderson, 258 F.3d at 709-12; Gonzales, 121 F.3d at 943-44 ("[T]he
severity of the punishment is not excessive, as evidenced by a comparison to the Rummel
benchmark.").
209 United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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sentences within and outside a state.210 The prison sentence would be
unconstitutional if other states did not have similar sentencing schemes.2 ,1 2 2
Since Supreme Court precedent had "not been a model of clarity," ,
lower courts split on crucial aspects of sentence disproportionality claims.
The most significant split among lower courts was whether individualized
facts (sometimes referred to as mitigating factors) should be considered in
the disproportionality analysis. 1 3 For example, should a court consider the
offense of felony drug possession with intent to distribute the same when
214
the offender was caught with a dozen doses compared to 50,000 doses?
In Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant's status
"cannot be considered in the abstract" and considered the defendant's age,
battles with alcohol, non-violent criminal past, and problems holding a job
to reach its conclusion that his sentence was disproportionate to his
crime. 215 But in Harmelin v. Michigan, five Justices held that courts should
not consider mitigating factors, such as the offender's age, unless the
criminal statute identifies the factor as significant.21 6 Nonetheless, lower
courts have disagreed whether the age of the defendant, 21 7 the culpability of
the defendant,21 8 or the availability of parole 219 should be considered in the
threshold assessment of gross disproportionality between sentence and

210

See, e.g., Henderson, 258 F.3d at 712-14.

211

See, e.g., id.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
Compare Henderson, 258 F.3d at 709-10 (considering the relative small amount of

212

213

drugs found on the offender, the offender's minimum culpability, and the offender's lack of
a criminal past to find a sentence unconstitutional), with Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d
392, 406 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The Supreme Court has drawn the line of required individualized
sentencing at capitalcases.").
214 See Henderson, 258 F.3d at 709-12 (finding that the number of doses is a relevant
factor in assessing disproportionality).
215 463 U.S. 277, 296, 297 n.22 (1983).
216 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991).
217 Compare Bocian v. Godinez, 101 F.3d 465, 472 (7th Cir. 1996) (refraining to
consider the defendant's age, sixty-six, in its proportionality analysis), with Hawkins v.
Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The chronological age of a defendant is a
factor that can be considered in determining whether a punishment is grossly
disproportionate to the crime inasmuch as it relates to his culpability.").
218 Compare Henderson, 258 F.3d at 710 ("In assessing the proportionality of the
punishment, we also consider the culpability of the defendant."), with United States v. Walls,
215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to consider the offender's motive or purpose
in its disproportionality assessment).
219 See, e.g., Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1284 (recognizing parole as a relevant consideration
in proportionality review).
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crime. Most courts did agree that sentences for violent crimes were less
likely to be found disproportionate.220
B. EWING AND SUBSEQUENT LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF
SENTENCE DISPROPORTIONALITY CLAIMS
The plurality opinion in Ewing implemented Justice Kennedy's
analytical framework from Harmelin without any explicit changes. 22' Thus,
facially at least, the plurality opinion does not seem to significantly alter the
Court's sentence proportionality doctrine. However, the plurality opinion
repeatedly stressed California's legitimate right to determine criminal
policy, suggesting that courts should be even more deferential to state
criminal policy decisions.222 In particular, Justice O'Connor stated that
incapacitation of repeat criminals, including property offenders, is a
constitutional criminal policy decision.223 Perhaps most significantly,
though, the Court's holding gives lower courts another factual benchmark
for assessing sentence disproportionality claims. A key fact in the case was
that Ewing was eligible for parole in twenty-five years, thus closing the gap
between the unconstitutional sentence in Solem where no parole was
available and the constitutional sentence in Rummel where the offender was
eligible for parole in twelve years. 4
Subtleties in the plurality opinion, however, indicate a change in the
Court's sentence disproportionality doctrine. First, the plurality opinion
found support for California's criminal policy by repeatedly noting that
most other states had similar criminal statutes. 25 This analysis seems
similar to the interjurisdictional comparison advocated in Solem, but denied
in Harmelin. Perhaps the Court is conceding that interjurisdictional
analysis is one of the few objective criteria available for assessing if a
punishment is unusual. Second, the plurality opinion framed the facts
generally, rather than individually. 226 Thus, the opinion paralleled the five
220

See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 944, n.14 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting

that Supreme Court precedent directs courts to consider violent crimes more seriously than
non-violent crimes).
... Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (plurality opinion).
222 Id. at 24-29 (plurality opinion).
223 Id. at 24 (plurality opinion).
224 See id. at 37-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the critical difference between
Solem and Rummel was the availability of parole).
225 Id. at 24 (plurality opinion) ("[M]ost States have had laws providing for enhanced
sentencing of repeat offenders."); Id. at 28 (plurality opinion) ("Theft of $1,200 in property
is a felony under federal law and in the vast majority of States.") (internal citations omitted).
226 Id. at 28 (plurality opinion) (describing Ewing's crime as felony grand theft rather
than Ewing's description of his crime as "shoplifting three golf clubs").
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Justice holding in Harmelin that individual facts, such as offender's age and
culpability, should not be considered in a disproportionality claim. 227 Third,
the plurality opinion stated that proportionality analysis should consider
"not only [the offender's] current felony, but also his long history of felony
recidivism. '228 This seems to weaken the holding in Solem, where the
Court held that proportionality review must "focus on the principle felony,"
though prior convictions were also relevant.229
Nonetheless, lower court opinions have not interpreted Ewing as a
major change in sentence proportionality jurisprudence. 230 As one court
succinctly stated, "Ewing does not significantly clarify the 'grossly
disproportionate' standard.,

231

Lower courts still primarily determine if a

sentence is grossly disproportionate by comparing the facts of the
challenged sentence with those in Supreme Court cases.232 However, two
courts have already found a sentence unconstitutional since Ewing,
233
suggesting Ewing has not greatly limited sentence proportionality review.
It is not surprising that lower courts remain confused on certain aspects of
proportionality review given the plurality opinion's failure to establish clear
criteria for disproportionality assessment. For instance, justices of the
Supreme Court of Arizona disagreed about whether Ewing directed courts
to consider the culpability of the defendant. 34 Thus, Ewing has not
clarified sentence proportionality jurisprudence.

227 However, the plurality opinion cited a footnote in Solem where the Court considered
individual facts, such as the offender's age and culpability. Id. at 28 (plurality opinion).
228 Id. at 28-30 (plurality opinion).
229 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 n.21 (1983).
230 Lower courts accept the three Justice plurality opinion as the controlling rule of law.

See, e.g., Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894, 906-07 (Del. 2003). But see State v. Clifton, 580
S.E.2d 40, 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("Due to the failure of a majority of Justices to reach a
consensus on the basis for the result, Ewing does not significantly clarify the 'grossly
disproportionate' standard other than to reaffirm it will be violated only in the 'rare' case.").
For practical reasons, the lower courts should consider Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
as the controlling law, since the plurality's sentence proportionality determination controls
whether the Court would find a sentence constitutional or not. That is, Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas would always find a sentence constitutional. The dissenters would never
find a sentence constitutional that the plurality did not find constitutional. Thus, the three
Justice plurality determination forms a majority with either Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas or the dissenters.
231 Clifton, 580 S.E.2d at 44.
232 See, e.g., Crosby, 824 A.2d at 909-11 (finding inference of gross disproportionality
based on comparison with facts in Solem, Rummel, and Ewing).
233 Id. at 912-13; State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 75 (Ariz. 2003).
234 Compare Davis, 79 P.3d at 71 (finding that the Ewing Court "examined the specific
facts and circumstances of the defendant's crime" to justify considering the defendant's
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VI. ANALYSIS

In Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court again failed to clarify a
standard for constitutional review of prison sentences.2 35 The plurality
opinion employed the analytical framework developed by Justice Kennedy
in his concurrence in Harmelin.2 36 This framework was an attempt by
Justice Kennedy to reconcile the Supreme Court's conflicting
proportionality jurisprudence 237 by extracting common principles from the
Court's opinions.23 8 Regrettably, these principles appear to have the
practical effect of allowing state legislative bodies to decide the bounds of
the Eighth Amendment.23 9 In Lockyer v. Andrade, decided on the same day
as Ewing and also concerning an Eighth Amendment challenge to
California's three strikes statute, the Court narrowed when federal courts
should review a state court's sentence proportionality decision. 240 Both
decisions significantly reduce the role of the federal judiciary in
determining the contours of the Eighth Amendment's forbiddance of
grossly disproportionate sentences.241 In doing so, the Supreme Court is
avoiding its duty to determine what sentences are forbidden by the

culpability), with id. at 80 (McGregor, Vice C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that an appeals court should not consider culpability in its sentencing review).
235 See Clifton, 580 S.E.2d at 44.
236 Ewing, 538 U.S. 11, at 23 (plurality opinion).
237 The Supreme Court has only twice ruled a prison sentence was unconstitutional
because it was grossly disproportionate to the offense. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303
(1983); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 359 (1910). However, Weems involved an
unusual punishment scheme-including permanent loss of civil rights to the defendant-that
perhaps influenced the Court's decision to find the sentence unconstitutional. Weems, 217
U.S. at 362-66; see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 273 (1980) (noting that the Weems
Court's "finding of disproportionality cannot be wrenched from the extreme facts of the
case"). Thus, the Supreme Court's five to four decision in Solem v. Helm marks the only
unambiguous holding by the Court that a grossly disproportionate prison sentence was
unconstitutional. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303. However, in other narrow decisions the Court has
denied proportionality claims similar to Solem's. See Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (holding the
mandatory life sentenced imposed under a Texas recidivist statute following defendant's
third felony conviction in obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses did not violate the Eighth
Amendment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009 (1991) ("[P]etitioner's sentence of
life imprisonment without parole for his crime of possession of more than 650 grams of
cocaine does not violate the Eighth Amendment.").
238 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001.
...See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) (A habitual felon statute does not offend
the Eighth Amendment when the state has a "reasonable basis" for believing that the statute
will "advance the goals of its criminal justice system in any substantial way.").
240 538 U.S. 63, 72-75 (2003).
241 Of course, state courts also can determine that a sentence offends the Eighth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

SUPREME COURTREVIEW

[Vol. 94

Constitution of the United States.24 2 The Court needs to assert a more
active role in protecting an individual's Eighth Amendment guarantee from
excessive prison sentence. In addition, the Court needs to clearly define the
criteria it considers under prison sentence review.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S SENTENCE
DISPROPORTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE
1. The Validity of JudicialReview of DisproportionatePrisonSentences
In Ewing, seven Justices held that the Eighth Amendment forbids
excessive sentences in extreme cases.243 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
argued that the Eighth Amendment does not forbid disproportionate
sentences, but only forbids cruel and unusual modes of punishments. 2 " The
plurality opinion gives great deference to legislative bodies to determine the
bounds of constitutional sentences. 245 However, if the Eighth Amendment
does forbid disproportionate sentences, then the Court-not legislative
bodies-must determine what sentences are unconstitutional. 246 A textual
analysis of the Eighth Amendment and a review of its history indicate that
the Eighth Amendment forbids disproportionate sentences. In addition,
Supreme Court precedent demands that criminal punishments be in
proportion to the crime.
Obviously, the best way of understanding a law is by looking at its
text-that is why we write them down. The Eighth Amendment states,
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted., 247 A punishment is cruel if it is
"disposed to inflict pain" or "bitterly conducted: devoid of mildness" or
"severe: distressing.,' 248 A punishment is unusual by "being out of the
ordinary" or "deviating from the normal. ' 249 A textual interpretation of the
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause would be that it forbids a
punishment that deviates from the normal and causes pain. Thus, the
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause should at least forbid the
242 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.") (emphasis added).
243 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22 (plurality opinion); id. at 35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 31 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in

the judgment).
245 Id. at 28 (plurality opinion).
246 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
247 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
248 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
249

Id. at 2514.

546 (1976).

EWING v. CALIFORNIA

2004]

hypothetical case of a life sentence for overtime parking since it is out of
the ordinary and would cause pain. 5 °
Furthermore, it would be odd for the Eighth Amendment to forbid the
lesser punishment of an excessive fine, but allow the harsher penalty of an
excessive prison sentence. 25' Justice Scalia suggests one reason the
American Framers might have been concerned about excessive fines but not
excessive prison terms, is that fines are a source of revenue for the state
while imprisonment costs the state money. 2 Thus, a legislature would
have an incentive to exact excessive fines and a disincentive to exact
excessive prison sentences because that would be a burden to the
legislature's constituency.25 3 However, this economic analysis does not
properly emphasize the Constitution's protection to an individual to be free
from improper government interference. 4 Furthermore, legislative bodies
often fail to estimate the costs of criminal imprisonment when creating
sentencing laws, so this does not properly regulate the state from applying
excessive sentences.255
Justice Scalia also argues that the historical evidence surrounding the
adoption of the Eighth Amendment only indicates concern over cruel and
unusual modes of punishment.2 56 It is not surprising that the few historical
references surrounding the adoption of the Eighth Amendment indicate a
concern only with certain types of punishments. 7 The use of "racks and
gibbets" by the English government would still be fresh in the minds of the
Americans forming a government with the potential to punish. 258 However,
the broad wording of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause was
likely an intentional choice by the framers to allow future generations to
define cruel and unusual punishments. 259 The Framers could easily have

250
251
252

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.1 1(1980).
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9 (1991).

253 Id.
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The Bill of Rights primarily protects individuals against intrusion from a powerful

government. See U.S. CONST. amend. I-VII.
255See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: ESTIMATED
BENEFITS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY SENTENCING LAW 34 (1994).

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979-82.
See Granucci, supra note 12, at 841-42.
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259 Thomas Jefferson wrote to Madison during the debates on the Constitution, "the earth
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belongs always to the living generations." JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX 131 (1998).
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worded the Eighth Amendment to forbid the use of "racks 2 and
gibbets," but
60
that would limit the Amendment's protection in the future.
Moreover, Americans believed they retained all the rights of English
citizens when they separated from England.26' Indeed, the language of the
Eighth Amendment was derived from the English Declaration of Rights of
1689.262 The prohibition of excessive fines in the English Declaration of
Rights came from the Magna Carta's prohibition of excessive fines.263
English common law courts extended the Magna Carta's proportionality
requirement to prison sentences when they replaced criminal fines as the
common mode of punishment in England during the 1400s.264 Presumably,
the English Declaration of Rights maintained this prohibition against
disproportionate prison sentences. Thus, Americans likely believed they
retained this protection from disproportionate sentences when they adopted
the Eighth Amendment.
Supreme Court precedent also demands proportionality review under
the Eighth Amendment. For instance, the Supreme Court reviews capital
punishment cases based on proportionality. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court
held that, because of disproportionality, it was a violation of the "Cruel and
Unusual Punishments" Clause to impose capital punishment for rape of an
adult woman. 65 In Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that it violated the
Eighth Amendment, because of disproportionality, to impose the death
penalty upon a participant in a felony that results in murder, without any
inquiry into the participant's intent to kill. 266 The Supreme Court has also
recently held that the execution of a mentally retarded criminal is a
disproportionate punishment.26 7 Justice Scalia tried to distinguish these
cases as "an aspect of our death penalty jurisprudence, rather than a
generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law" because "death is
different., 268 As Justice White points out in his dissent in Harmelin,
however, this would reject the notion that the Clause only forbids modes or
methods of punishment. 269 Presumably, the death penalty is a cruel and
See Granucci, supra note 12 at 841-42.
261 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983).
262 See Granucci, supra note 12, at 840.
263 Cf id. at 844-45.
264 See id. at 846-47.
260

265 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
266 458 U.S. 782 (1982).

267 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (concluding that the death penalty is not
suitable for mentally retarded criminals because they lack the culpability required for such
an extreme punishment).
268 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991).
269 Id. at 1013-15 (White, J., dissenting).
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unusual mode of punishment or it is not. 21 ° Moreover, the Supreme Court
fines 27 '
requires punishments to be proportional to the offense for criminal
and civil damages.27 2
Most important, the Supreme Court has long accepted a
proportionality requirement for prison sentences. The first disproportionate
sentencing claim was made to the Supreme Court in 1892 in O'Neil v.
Vermont. 2 73 The majority opinion of the Court did not consider the Eighth
Amendment claim since the Eighth Amendment did not apply to states at
the time.274 However, all three dissenting Justices agreed that the Eighth
Amendment forbids disproportionate sentences.2 75 In Rummel, the Court
stated that it is a matter of legislative prerogative to determine the prison
sentences for crimes classified as felonies.276 In a fateful footnote,
however, the Court conceded that proportionality review could come into
play in the extreme case where a legislature made overtime parking a felony
punishable by life imprisonment.277 In Solem, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment includes the right to be free from excessive
punishments.27 8 Since Solem, a majority of the Court has since upheld the
notion that the Eighth Amendment at least forbids grossly disproportionate
sentences. 2 9 Thus, Supreme Court precedent recognizes a proportionality
requirement under the Eighth Amendment between a criminal's punishment
and his offense.
2. The ProportionalityPrinciples Give too Much Deference to State
Legislative Bodies and Provide Little Guidanceto Lower Courts
a. Criminal Punishment Determinations are Normally the Province of
Legislative Bodies
The Court's first proportionality principle cautions that criminal
punishment determinations are normally the province of legislative
270 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1997).
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State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (finding the Fifth Amendment prohibits
disproportionate civil damages).
273 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
272
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Id. at 331-32.
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bodies.28 ° Certainly, this is true when the criminal punishment is
constitutional, but legislative bodies cannot make criminal punishment
decisions that contradict the Constitution.281 The Court gives too much
deference to legislative bodies to determine whether a sentence falls within
the bounds of the Constitution. In Ewing, the Court stated that a habitual
sentencing scheme is legitimate if the legislature has a "reasonable basis"
for believing the sentence "advance[s] the goals of its criminal justice
system in any substantial way., 282 Surely, though, a state could not compel
a defendant to be a witness against herself simply because it advances the
state's criminal justice goals. The suggestion that a legislatively mandated
punishment is per se constitutional conflicts with the principle of judicial
review. 283 In Marbury v. Madison, the Court established that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
284
the law is."
The Court supports its deference to legislative bodies by observing that
they have the support of the majority of the people.2 85 However, the whole
point of the Constitution is to protect certain rights against majority
infringement. 286 If popular will determined what is constitutional, then the
Constitution would have no value. Instead, the Constitution prohibits the
government from using popular will as a justification for intruding on an
individual's rights.287 The rights of citizens convicted of a crime are
particularly vulnerable to infringement by popular will, as many believe
that one who breaks the law does not deserve the protection of the law.
Moreover, infringements on the rights of criminals are easily ignored, since
they are are isolated from the public. Yet criminals are still legal citizens of
the United States protected under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments. The Supreme Court does not adequately
acknowledge an individual's federal Constitutional right to be free from
280 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment). It is unclear if Justice Kennedy is just stating the obvious that legislative bodies
should be given deference when they employ constitutional criminal punishments or if he is
making the more alarming statement that the bounds of the Eighth Amendment change
depending on legislative determinations.
281 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
282 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted).
283 See Hannelin, 501 U.S. at 1017 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
285 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in
the judgment).
286 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
287 California's "Three Strikes" statute is particularly suspect, since it was quickly passed
after a high profile kidnapping by a repeat criminal that led to a woman's death. Ewing, 538
U.S. at 14-15 (plurality opinion).
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excessive sentencing when it defers to legislative bodies. The Supreme
Court has protected federal rights against state infringement in the past,
such as the right to an attorney 288 and the right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures. 289 The Supreme Court must also protect a United
States citizen's right to be free from disproportionate sentencing.
b. The Eighth Amendment Allows a Variety of Legitimate Penological
Theories
The Court's second proportionality principle stresses that the Eighth
Amendment allows a variety of penological theories. 290 The traditional
1 291
justification for punishment is that it is retribution for an injustice.
According to Aristotle, the law should treat the criminal and victim as
equals.292 If the court determines a person has inflicted an injustice on
another, the judge should redress the inequality by punishing the offender
an equivalent amount, thereby making the parties equal again.293 Thus,
Aristotle seeks strict proportionality between the punishment and the
offense. 294 In its purest form, strict proportionality would require the same
offense perpetrated by the criminal to be committed back on the criminal.295
This is exemplified in the Old Testament's punishment principle of an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.296 However, society's acceptance of prison
sentences as the standard for criminal punishment makes determining strict
proportionality between punishment and crime difficult, as a prison
sentence is usually different from the criminal's act.
Thus, strict
proportionality is difficult to maintain under modern penological theory.
Furthermore, strict proportionality is inappropriate given the Supreme
Court's acceptance of utilitarian penological theories.297
Unlike a
retributive justification for punishment that aims to punish individuals in
relation to the scope of their offenses, a utilitarian justification seeks to
impose punishment that will produce beneficial results for society in the
288

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.

455 (1942)).
289 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949)).
290 Harnelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
291See Granucci, supra note 12, at 844.
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future.298 Three main penological theories have developed under the
utilitarian view: deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.299
Deterrence is based on the theory that if a criminal knows he will be
punished harshly for a crime, then he will be discouraged from committing
that crime. 300 A person could have an incentive to commit a crime if an
offender's sentence was strictly proportioned to his crime. 30 ' For instance,
suppose that half of robbery crimes are solved and that robbery is punished
in exact proportion to the amount of money stolen. A criminal planning to
steal a hundred dollars would expect only a fifty dollar penalty (hundred
dollar punishment multiplied by fifty percent chance of being caught), thus
providing an incentive to the criminal to commit crime. Thus, by setting
punishments that are disproportionately higher than the offense, a deterrent
punishment seeks to discourage crime. 302 However, detractors of deterrent
punishments argue that it is unfair to punish a person in excess of his crime
just to set an example to the rest of society.30 3 As Immanuel Kant noted,
"One man ought never to be dealt with as a means subservient to the
"304
purpose of another ....
Rehabilitation is based on the penological theory that punishment can
help reform the criminal so that his wish to commit crimes will be lessened,
and perhaps so that he can be a useful member of society in the future.30 5
The unpleasantness of serving a punishment might be enough to make a
criminal avoid future crime and punishment.30 6 However, rehabilitation
usually involves positive steps to alter criminal behavior and develop skills,
in order to make the criminal less antisocial.30 7 Critics of rehabilitative
punishment question its success in correcting criminal behavior and object
30 8
to rewarding a criminal with positive steps such as education.
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Incapacitation is based on the theory that isolation of a criminal from
society will end the risk that he will harm society again.3 °9 Incapacitation
physically prevents a dangerous person from acting upon their destructive
tendencies. 310 The death penalty, for instance, is a way for society to
guarantee that incredibly violent criminals will never cause future harm to
society.311 Critics argue that incapacitation can be both overly expensive
for society and unnecessarily cruel to criminals that potentially would never
commit another crime.312
The Eighth Amendment should nonetheless provide a ceiling against
excessive utilitarian-based prison sentences. Acceptance of utilitarian
theories of punishment makes strict proportionality impractical. Indeed,
some of the utilitarian justifications for punishment overtly contradict strict
proportionality between punishment and offense.313
For example,
deterrence explicitly makes the punishment disproportionately greater than
the crime so that criminals have a disincentive to commit the crime.3 4
However, this should not mean that courts have no role in reviewing
deterrent-based punishments.31 5
Courts need to consider whether the
punishment does indeed provide a benefit to society or whether it is just a
"purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. 3 16 For
example, imposing a life sentence without parole to a child that steals a
candy bar would certainly deter other candy thefts and incapacitate the child
from stealing anymore candy bars, but it is unreasonably excessive in
achieving those objectives. 317 Thus, the Supreme Court should require that
a penological theory does not lead to excessive punishment.
c. The Nature of Our Federal System Allows Diverse Sentencing
Determinations Among the States
The Court's third proportionality principle stresses that our federal
system of government naturally leads to different sentencing determinations

310

Id.
Id.

311

id.
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311 See id. at 33-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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among the states. 3 1 This principle emphasizes that each state is a separate
319
entity and is only subject to some federal government regulations.
Comparing a state's sentencing standards with other states' would be like
320
comparing the state's sentencing standards with other nations.
Differences between state sentencing guidelines allow states to experiment
with different penological solutions. 321
However, the states cannot
experiment with penological solutions that offend the Constitution of the
United States.322 Again, the Court seems to be confusing legitimate
deference to state legislative determinations that are constitutional and
illegitimate deference to state legislative determinations that are
unconstitutional.
Comparison of a state's sentencing standards with
sentencing standards in other states helps determine if the sentence is
unusual under the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause.323 Perhaps
admitting this point, the plurality opinion in Ewing often does conduct
interjurisdictional sentencing comparisons to support that California's three
strikes law is not unusual.324 However, a comparison between a state's
sentencing standards and the federal government's sentencing standards
provides a more useful inference that a state's sentence is disproportionate
to federal sentencing norms.325 Thus, the dissent in Ewing was correct
to
326
stress the federal mandatory sentencing guidelines in its comparison.
d. Proportionality Review Should be Guided by Objective Factors
The Court's final proportionality principle states that proportionality
review should be based on objective factors. 327 Nonetheless, the Court
frankly concedes that its "cases exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what
factors may indicate gross disproportionality. ''328 Lower courts are

318Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999-1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 id.

322See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
323 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
324 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (plurality opinion) ("[M]ost States have had laws providing for
enhanced sentencing of repeat offenders."); id. at 28 (plurality opinion) ("Theft of $1,200 in
property is a felony under federal law and in the vast majority of States.") (internal citations
omitted).
325 Cf.id. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
326 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
327 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
328 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
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therefore placed in a tough position: the Supreme Court requires them to
use objective factors, but concedes those factors are difficult to ascertain.329
Most lower courts avoid this bind by comparing the facts of the case with
the facts in Supreme Court cases to determine whether a sentence is
disproportionate. 330 Though this practice appears objective, whether the
facts of two cases can be distinguished greatly depends on whether you
want the cases distinguished or not. This is particularly true given that the
Supreme Court has failed to clarify whether courts should consider facts
specifically or generally. 33' Thus, a lower court could find that a felony
drug possession with intent to distribute a small amount of drugs is similar
to Harmelin, since it involves a felony drug possession charge, or dissimilar
to Harmelin, since it does not involve a large amount of drugs. 332 Indeed,
courts 3appear
to consider individual facts when they feel a sentence is
33
unjust.

In addition, the Supreme Court has only reviewed a few cases for
sentence disproportionality. Thus, lower courts are left to fill many gaps
between cases. Yet how is a lower court supposed to assess factual
situations within these gaps without clear objective factors? Many lower
courts have turned to Justice Breyer's dissent in Ewing for help in such
situations, since he specified three factors that he thought were relevant in
disproportionality claims: (1) "the length of the prison term in real time";
(2) the sentence-triggering offense; and (3) the offender's criminal
history.334 Justice Breyer is correct to separate a defendant's sentence329

See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[Justice Kennedy]

did not outline specific criteria for courts to consider in making this threshold determination
of gross disproportionality.").
330 See supra Part V.
331In Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court stated the defendant's status "cannot be
considered in the abstract" and considered the defendant's age, battles with alcohol, nonviolent criminal past, and problems holding a job to reach its conclusion that his sentence
was disproportionate to his crime. 463 U.S. 277, 296, 297 n.22 (1983). In Harmelin v.
Michigan, five Justices held that courts should not consider mitigating factors, such as the
offender's age, unless the criminal statute identifies the factor as significant. 501 U.S. at
994-96. The plurality opinion in Ewing was unclear whether individualized facts should be
considered since it considered Ewing's disproportionality claim using generalized facts. 538
U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) (noting that Ewing's crime was not "shoplifting three golf
clubs," but felony grand theft). But the Court also cited a footnote in Solem that considered
mitigating factors. Id. (plurality opinion).
332 Cf Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001).
333See State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 72 (Ariz. 2003) (finding a mandatory fifty-two year
prison sentence for a twenty-year-old defendant for having non-coerced sex with two postpubescent teenage girls disproportionate because of the offender's youth, after noting
comments from jury and victims' mothers that sentence was unjust).
334Ewing, 538 U.S. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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triggering offense from his criminal past. In Ewing, the plurality opinion
considered Ewing's criminal history collectively with his sentencetriggering offense when assessing the .severity of his crime. 335 But
combining the sentence-triggering offense with the offender's criminal
history may unreasonably inflate the severity of the crime.336 For instance,
if a criminal with a violent criminal history is arrested for illegally bringing
in foreign agriculture to the United States, a court that sentenced the
criminal as if he again committed a violent offense would be inflating the
offender's crime. Instead, the court should sentence him for breaking
United States' customs law and augment the sentence based on his past
criminal record.
However, the majority of the Supreme Court correctly refused to
accept parole as a factor in disproportionality claims in Rummel. 337 Parole
is not an enforceable individual right, but is instead dependent on state
discretion. 338 For instance, as of 2000, the parole authority in California
only recommended parole in one percent of the 2000 cases that came before
them with a life sentence. 339 By allowing courts to consider parole in
assessing the severity of a sentence, the Court would be allowing states an
easy way to tailor constitutional sentencing schemes while maintaining
control over a criminal's sentence.
B. THE PROPER ROLE FOR COURTS IN REVIEIWING EXCESSIVE PRISON
SENTENCES
The Supreme Court's current sentence disproportionality jurisprudence
is so muddled that it is useless. 340 The Court appears to say that the Eighth
Amendment forbids disproportionate sentences, but that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit sentences mandated by state legislative
bodies, except if the sentence is not the result of a criminal policy decision.
The Court needs to refocus its sentence disproportionality jurisprudence on
the Eighth Amendment's forbiddance of cruel and unusual punishment. A
textual analysis of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause provides a

31Id. at 28-30 (plurality opinion).
336 See id. at 39-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
337 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1980).
338 Id.

339 Brief for Amici Curiae Families Against Mandatory Minimums at 18, Ewing v.
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340 See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[Justice Kennedy]
did not outline specific criteria for courts to consider in making this threshold determination
of gross disproportionality.").
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good guide for what sentences are prohibited. In particular, a sentence must
be both (1) cruel and (2) unusual for the Constitution to apply.
A court should find a sentence "cruel" if it is excessive.34'
Unfortunately, there is no clear line for determining when a sentence is
excessive. This determination is much like the Court's current threshold
test of whether a comparison between an offender's sentence and his crime
creates an inference of disproportionality. However, the Court currently
makes this analysis from the point of view of the state, not of the individual.
Thus, incapacitation of a repeat thief is constitutional because states have an
interest in curbing the harm caused by repeat thefts. However, the Eighth
Amendment was adopted to protect individuals from government intrusion.
Therefore, the question should be whether the sentence is excessive
considering the specific facts of the individual. States may still use
utilitarian-based punishment schemes under this test, but they cannot be so
broad that they cause purposeless pain on individuals.342 By adopting this
approach, courts would link sentencing review with other areas where the
court reviews sentence proportionality, such as capital punishment,
excessive criminal fines, and excessive civil fines.
Second, a court should find a sentence unusual if it is "out of the
ordinary" or "deviating from the normal.
A comparison between a
state's sentencing standards and the federal government's sentencing
standards provides a useful test for determining if the sentence is unusual
given federal standards.34 4 However, a court should also compare the
sentence with sentences in other states. This determination is primarily an
objective determination. Fears that this infringes on federalism rights are
diminished by the fact that a sentence must be both cruel and unusual.
Thus, if a state experiments with a scheme that is unusual, but not cruel, the
Eighth Amendment would not apply.

341
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Indeed,

nearly all sentences are "disposed to inflict pain," so cruel would be easily met under the
dictionary definition.
342 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (stating that a punishment offends
the Eighth Amendment "if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain").
343WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2514 (1976).
144 Cf
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Ewing Court held that the Eighth Amendment's proportionality
requirement did not prohibit the State of California from sentencing a repeat
felon to a prison term of twenty-five years to life under the State's "Three
Strikes and You're Out Laws." 345 A majority of the Court correctly
affirmed that the Eighth Amendment has a proportionality principle that
applies to noncapital sentences. 346 But the Court's opinion gives too much
deference to legislative bodies and not enough consideration to an
individual's constitutional right to protection from excessive punishment.
James J. Brennan
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Id. at 30-31 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 23-24 (plurality opinion); Id. at 35-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

